Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/art1frag1_user.html#art1_hd4 (Last updated 2/5/2014)
ARTICLE I
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
The Constitution nowhere contains an express injunction to preserve the boundaries of the three broad powers it grants, nor does it expressly enjoin maintenance of a system of checks and balances. Yet, it does grant to three separate branches the powers to legislate, to execute, and to adjudicate, and it provides throughout the document the means by which each of the branches could resist the blandishments and incursions of the others. The Framers drew up our basic charter against a background rich in the theorizing of scholars and statesmen regarding the proper ordering in a system of government of conferring sufficient power to govern while withholding the ability to abridge the liberties of the governed.1
The Theory Elaborated and Implemented
When the colonies separated from Great Britain following the Revolution, the framers of their constitutions were imbued with the profound tradition of separation of powers, and they freely and expressly embodied in their charters the principle.2 But the theory of checks and balances was not favored because it was drawn from Great Britain, and, as a consequence, violations of the separation–of–powers doctrine by the legislatures of the States were common[p.64]place events prior to the convening of the Convention.3 As much as theory did the experience of the States furnish guidance to the Framers in the summer of 1787.4
The doctrine of separation of powers, as implemented in drafting the Constitution, was based on several principles generally held: the separation of government into three branches, legislative, executive, and judicial; the conception that each branch performs unique and identifiable functions that are appropriate to each; and the limitation of the personnel of each branch to that branch, so that no one person or group should be able to serve in more than one branch simultaneously. To a great extent, the Constitution effectuated these principles, but critics objected to what they regarded as a curious intermixture of functions, to, for example, the veto power of the President over legislation and to the role of the Senate in the appointment of executive officers and judges and in the treaty–making process. It was to these objections that Madison turned in a powerful series of essays.5
Madison recurred to “the celebrated” Montesquieu, the “oracle who is always consulted,” to disprove the contentions of the critics. “[T]his essential precaution in favor of liberty,” that is, the separation of the three great functions of government had been achieved, but the doctrine did not demand rigid separation. Montesquieu and other theorists “did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or controul over, the acts of each other,” but rather liberty was endangered “where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department.”6 That the doctrine did not demand absolute separation provided the basis for preservation of separation of powers in action. Neither sharply drawn demarcations of institutional boundaries nor appeals to the electorate were sufficient.7 Instead, the security against concentration of powers “consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.” Thus, “[a]mbition must be made to[p.65]counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”8
Footnotes
1 Among the best historical treatments are M. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967), and W. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers (1965).
2 Thus the Constitution of Virginia of 1776 provided: “The legislative, executive, and judiciary department shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them, at the same time[.]” Reprinted in 10 W. Swindler (ed.), Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions (1979), 52. See also 5 id., 96, Art. XXX of Part First, Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: “In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men.”
3 “In republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.” The Federalist No. 51 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 350 (Madison). See also id., No. 48, 332–334. This theme continues today to influence the Court’s evaluation of congressional initiatives. E.g., Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 S.Ct. 252, 273–2274, 277 (1991). But compare id., 286 n. 3 (Justice White dissenting).
4 The intellectual history through the state period and the Convention proceedings is detailed in G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (1969) (see index entries under “separation of powers”).
5 The Federalist Nos. 47–51 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 323–353 (Madison).
6 Id., No. 47, 325–326(emphasis in original).
7 Id., Nos. 47–49, 325–343.
8 Id., No. 51, 349.
The Theory Elaborated and Implemented
When the colonies separated from Great Britain following the Revolution, the framers of their constitutions were imbued with the profound tradition of separation of powers, and they freely and expressly embodied in their charters the principle.2 But the theory of checks and balances was not favored because it was drawn from Great Britain, and, as a consequence, violations of the separation–of–powers doctrine by the legislatures of the States were common[p.64]place events prior to the convening of the Convention.3 As much as theory did the experience of the States furnish guidance to the Framers in the summer of 1787.4
The doctrine of separation of powers, as implemented in drafting the Constitution, was based on several principles generally held: the separation of government into three branches, legislative, executive, and judicial; the conception that each branch performs unique and identifiable functions that are appropriate to each; and the limitation of the personnel of each branch to that branch, so that no one person or group should be able to serve in more than one branch simultaneously. To a great extent, the Constitution effectuated these principles, but critics objected to what they regarded as a curious intermixture of functions, to, for example, the veto power of the President over legislation and to the role of the Senate in the appointment of executive officers and judges and in the treaty–making process. It was to these objections that Madison turned in a powerful series of essays.5
Madison recurred to “the celebrated” Montesquieu, the “oracle who is always consulted,” to disprove the contentions of the critics. “[T]his essential precaution in favor of liberty,” that is, the separation of the three great functions of government had been achieved, but the doctrine did not demand rigid separation. Montesquieu and other theorists “did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or controul over, the acts of each other,” but rather liberty was endangered “where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department.”6 That the doctrine did not demand absolute separation provided the basis for preservation of separation of powers in action. Neither sharply drawn demarcations of institutional boundaries nor appeals to the electorate were sufficient.7 Instead, the security against concentration of powers “consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.” Thus, “[a]mbition must be made to[p.65]counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”8
Footnotes
1 Among the best historical treatments are M. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967), and W. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers (1965).
2 Thus the Constitution of Virginia of 1776 provided: “The legislative, executive, and judiciary department shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them, at the same time[.]” Reprinted in 10 W. Swindler (ed.), Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions (1979), 52. See also 5 id., 96, Art. XXX of Part First, Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: “In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men.”
3 “In republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.” The Federalist No. 51 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 350 (Madison). See also id., No. 48, 332–334. This theme continues today to influence the Court’s evaluation of congressional initiatives. E.g., Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 S.Ct. 252, 273–2274, 277 (1991). But compare id., 286 n. 3 (Justice White dissenting).
4 The intellectual history through the state period and the Convention proceedings is detailed in G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (1969) (see index entries under “separation of powers”).
5 The Federalist Nos. 47–51 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 323–353 (Madison).
6 Id., No. 47, 325–326(emphasis in original).
7 Id., Nos. 47–49, 325–343.
8 Id., No. 51, 349.
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Distribution of these pages on the Internet does not constitute consent to any use of this material for commercial redistribution either via the Internet or using some other form of hypertext distribution. Links to the collection or individual pages in it are welcome.
Many of the judicial opinions, statutes, regulations and other legal materials accessible from these pages are maintained by other institutions. Their use is, therefore, subject only to such conditions as those institutions set.
In those cases where the underlying texts are government documents, those texts lie in the public domain. The LII does not assert copyright in US Government works, but we do claim copyright in markup, navigation apparatus, and other value-added features of electronic editions of government publications. This material is covered by a Creative Commons license, viewable at:
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Conditions of Use The LII compilations aim to provide useful information. This should not be confused with legal advice. While the editors endeavor to have each collection at this site be accurate and complete, neither the LII nor Cornell warrants that the information is complete or accurate. Both disclaim all liability to any person for any loss caused by errors or omissions in this collection of information.
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